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Agrarian Experts And Social Justice
Land allotment norms in revolution and Civil War, 1917‑1920
Experts agricoles et justice sociale : les normes gouvernant la répartition des
terres pendant la révolution et la guerre civile, 1917-1920
David Darrow
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1 Of the popular  demands of  1917—Bread,  Land,  and Peace—only land was not  tied to
wartime  conditions.  Whether  expressed  as  the  “land  question”  (zemel´nyi  vopros),
“agrarian  question”  (agrarnyi  vopros),  “land  hunger”  (malozemel´ie)  or  simply  as  the
“insufficient allotment” (nedostatochnyi nadel), the question of land access and the place of
the  peasantry  in  the  Empire’s  future  economic  development  dogged  the  Emperor’s
ministers from the serf emancipation of 1861 until  the old regime’s end. The biggest
social justice issue in the Russian Empire—the moral question on the minds of imperial
subjects from the chancery halls of St. Petersburg to the peasant pastures of Podolsk—was
the  question  of  land.  The  normatized  land  allotment  (nadel)  objectified  the  moral
dimension of the land question. With origins as a tool of state agrarian policy dating at
least  to  eighteenth‑century  statutes  on  the  organization  of  crown  (udel)  lands  and
running through the Kiselev reforms of the state peasantry (1840s‑1850s), the normatized
land allotment, enshrouded in the moral fervor of Emperor Alexander II’s “scenario of
power” and his accompanying moniker “Tsar Liberator,” emerged from the Emancipation
process as a primary symbol of the state’s moral commitment to the peasantry’s well
being.1 Between  1861‑1917,  educated  society’s  interpretation  of  the  Emancipation
combined with the state’s “meliorative” and tutelage (opeka) approaches to the peasantry
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to create public expectations that the state was obligated to solve the agrarian question
by  ensuring  peasants  sufficient  access  to  land  (at  least  the  maximum regional  land
allotment size stipulated by the Emancipation statutes).2 Having posed the peasantry’s
plight as a question, society expected a state answer.
2 This  tendency  toward,  and  preference  for,  state  solutions—gosudarstvennost´ or
“state‑mindedness”—represented  a  tradition  with  roots  in  eighteenth‑century
cameralism and its notion of “public property” and the commonweal. It grew sharper
over  the  nineteenth  century  as  the  state  positioned  itself  (with  much  of  educated
society’s blessing) as the only entity that could preserve stability and international status
amidst a sea of parochial interests in a manner that protected the peasantry from the
predation  of  speculators  and  socialists.3 At  the  same  time  experts  in  and  out  of
government gained a greater sense of what technical expertise backed by state power
might achieve in terms of modernizing peasants viewed as benighted (“dark”), backward,
and in need of perpetual guidance.4 Experience on the ground re‑ordering territory on
the  imperial  periphery  to  facilitate  migration  to  Siberia  and  Central  Asia  and  the
continued  collection  of  statistical  information,  culminating  in  the  massive  land
organization project known as the Stolypin reforms, revealed common ground in the
agendas of state officials and agrarian experts. This reinforced the idea that the state
could correct the deficiencies of the Emancipation and fulfill its moral obligation to the
peasantry while at  the same time converting it  into a meaningful  contributor to the
national economy.5
3 The land allotment was a prominent component of all of these programs as well as many
of the land reform proposals that emerged in the Duma—a tool for solving the agrarian
question  by  ordering  agricultural  space.6 In  the  Russian  empire  this  land  allotment
mentalité defined a moral  approach to agrarian reform, especially from 1861 onward,
among conservative and liberal state officials, educated society, and the objects of reform
—peasants—alike. Indeed, by 1917 one might say that Yaney’s “urge to mobilize” was very
much an “urge to normatize” and that the allotment of land by norm—far from being a
“revival of the intelligentsia legacy” of the old Populists represented the continuation of
a general trend in land reform policy that had been nuanced by professionals as they
adapted their project to encounters in the field.7 Even experts who realized that the
solution  to  the  agrarian  question  rested  with  intensification  argued  that  granting
additional land allotments was the first step toward providing peasant households with
the requisite resources for adopting intensive agricultural techniques—that some level of
extensification was required to make intensification possible.8 There was a consensus
that, if managed properly, extensification was a viable part of agrarian reform (although
widely differing opinions existed as to the source of additional land).9 Even if honored as
much in the breach as in its observance, by 1917 experts and other elites (in and out of
government service), as well as peasants saw the normatized land allotment as a state
entitlement. It was a symbol of the state’s moral obligation to the peasantry embodied in
the Emancipation that all found wanting and in need of correction.10 Agrarian experts
could  thus  solve  the  Empire’s  agrarian  question  by  allotting  peasant  households
additional land according to local “norms” derived from the better information that had
accumulated since 1861. In other words, the normatized land allotment was not just an
exercise in “administrative utopia” or a statist attempt “to impose social change on a
people through administrative means.”11 It was a restoration of the promise of 1861 that
peasants, their advocates, and the rest of society had come to expect. The Old Regime
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land allotment, the product of servile life, continued to serve as an expression of rational
resource management in the name of national economic prosperity and improvement—a
rational approach to constructing a new and more productive rural economy in line with
previous reform efforts, including those initiated by Stolypin. The land allotment also
became the objectification of the post‑autocratic state’s moral obligation to the peasantry
(justice).  Allotment norms were a measure of social  justice,  a technocratic (and thus,
supposedly value‑neutral) solution to the land question rooted in earlier attempts at land
reorganization that met diverse political needs in a fragmented socio‑political world. This
reflected a broader agrarianism in Russian society—a consensus that the agrarian future
would center  on the peasantry  in  close  collaboration with agrarian experts  (broadly
defined)  and  that  it  was  incumbent  on  the  state  to ensure  peasant  households  a
“sufficient” endowment of land through allotment of land by norm.12
 
The main land committee and allotment by norm
4 Land reform topped the list of expectations that the autocracy’s end bequeathed to the
Provisional  Government.  To develop a land reform proposal  for consideration by the
Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government created a Main Land Committee (GZK)
under the Ministry of Agriculture. The GZK brought together government experts and
those generated by society’s engagement with the rural economy through both political
activism  and  zemstvo  employment.  Several  of  its  members,  such  as  Professor
A.A. Kaufman, incorporated experience in all three realms. Many members, including the
chair,  Professor  A.S. Posnikov,  objected  to  the  Stolypin  reforms  even  though  they
embraced their goal of increasing peasant productivity.13 The GZK sat at the apex of a
system  of  theoretically  subordinate  land  committees  on  the  provincial,  district  and
township levels.  All  committees  were  to  include local  experts  (zemstvo agronomists,
statisticians, etc.) that the GZK deemed best situated for ascertaining local conditions and
collecting data needed to shape agrarian reform and apply it at the local level.14 The
membership  of  the  land committees  intersected  with  non‑governmental  professional
groups such as the League of Agrarian Reforms (Lig Agrarnykh Reform), and represented
most political affiliations from the center‑right through the left. Many members were
also active in the Petrograd and provincial peasant congresses that convened throughout
1917. These intersections were fraught with political tensions, but also represented and
transmitted  a  common  knowledge  base  derived  from  academic  and  administrative
fieldwork with the peasant economy, as well as discussions of agrarian reform of the
preceding  decade.  Most,  such  as  N.P. Makarov  and  N.K. Volkov,  had  some  sort  of
advanced training in agrarian economics.  Based on their  experience,  there existed a
strong consensus that land norms represented the best means by which the agrarian
fruits of revolution could be allotted to meet peasant needs, fulfill their revolutionary
aspirations, and ensure just land distribution. Revolution and the establishment of the
GZK marked a triumph of the experts who, freed from the constraints of the old regime,
could  now  begin  to  position  peasant  participants  in  a  single  rural  economy  of
smallholders for developmental success.15 Everything they had spent their professional
lives  doing  had  prepared  them  for  this  moment—from  zemstvo  statistical  work  to
agronomy. As the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) N.Ia. Bykhovskii noted, allotment of land
by norm was the first step towards modernizing the agrarian economy (intensification)
and giving 10 million landless peasants access to land—the first step in developing the
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peasant labor economy as the foundation of Russia’s agricultural future. Land allotments,
agrarian improvement and social justice went hand in hand.16
5 A number of key issues confronted and divided GZK members. Would peasants become
landowners or merely receive use rights ? If not the former, what about the fate of the
Stolypin separators ?17 On what terms should the alienation of private land take place ?
Who should be allotted land—anyone who desires to farm it with their own labor or,
given limited resources, only those households currently engaged in farming ?18 Despite
these differences, widespread consensus existed on a number of fronts. First, members
saw themselves as experts charged with righting the mistakes of the 1861 Emancipation—
of correcting the perceived injustice of the past that had been demonstrated by statistical
studies and popularized in journal publications since the 1870s but that the old regime
had failed to ameliorate.19 Second, there was a consensus that,  with the exception of
model farms and specialized forms of husbandry, all land was now part of single national
land fond for allotment to those who worked it. Lands held by various state institutions
and  private  landholders  alike  would  be  subject  to  alienation  and  redistribution.  By
extension, most agreed that any “solution” of the land question must be a national one,
albeit one that carefully considered local circumstances. Finally, they agreed that the best
means of assuring an equal and just redistribution of land throughout the country was by
establishing land allotment norms that recognized the particularisms of local economies.
The  GZK  assigned  these  questions  to  subcommittees  whose  membership  overlapped
extensively with each other and with the League of Agrarian Reforms.
6 Mindful of the failings—real and imagined—of the 1861 Emancipation, mindful of the role
that agricultural professionals had played in exposing them, and committed to creating a
national  program  of  land  reform  aimed  at  eliminating  the  problem  of  insufficient
allotments in a just way, the specter of 1861 overshadowed the experts’ work as a moral
imperative in 1917. As GZK member N.P. Oganovskii noted before the war, the work of
Professor Iu.E. Ianson and other experts had discovered by the 1870s “that the greatest
causes of the pauperization of the peasant consist in the insufficiency of land allotments,
significantly reduced [urezannykh—“cut off”] by the emancipation.”20 Aware that history
would measure their achievements, Oganovskii and his peers did not want to find out
twenty years later that their reform had resulted in a redux of “insufficient allotments.”
The shadow of 1861 appeared in other forms as well. As N. Ozeretskovskii noted, “The
very name of these institutions [land committees] reminds us of the time of the reform of
1861 when prior to the emancipation of peasants were established … a Main Committee…
and then 48 provincial committees.” From his perspective, pomeshchiki populated these
local committees in 1861 and the deficiencies of the Emancipation resulted from their
narrow  class  interests.21 The  work  of  the  current  committees  would  be  guided  “by
different hands,” thus presenting an opportunity to redress these deficiencies  in the
interests of the people.22 Finally, memories of 1861 also hovered over the process in other
ways, including early consideration of introducing “peace arbitrators” (mirovyie posredniki
)  to  perform  a  similar  role  in  regulating  land  relations  as  they  had  under  the
Emancipation and in brief  explorations of  compensating private owners for alienated
land  with  a  redemption  operation.23 As  in  1861,  some  reformers  questioned  how
alienation would impact state credit institutions given the fact that over half of the land
to be  alienated as  part  of  the  proposed reform carried mortgages.  The ghost  of  the
banking crisis that had shaped the 1861 Emancipation still haunted the economy.24
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7 Given developments of  the previous decade,  particularly efforts by state officials and
agronomists to foster intensive cultivation as a means of solving the agrarian question,
the fact that reformers framed their work within the context of the Emancipation might
seem surprising.  Yet,  reformers  in  and out  of  government  had long recognized that
agrarian  reform—intensification—required  land  reform  first,  both  in  terms of
reorganization and in terms of ensuring household access to sufficient land resources.
Revolution sharpened the focus on the latter because peasants expected it and because it
provided experts the opportunity to create a better material basis for an improved rural
economy rooted in peasant agriculture by eliminating the last remaining constraints on
conceptualizing  all  land  as  a  public  good.  With  few  data  and  resources,  the  1861
reformers hoped to achieve little more than a peasant perception of improved living
conditions. This time, the experts charged with drawing up an agrarian reform proposal
were in far better shape from an information standpoint, and saw themselves as poised to
establish the material basis for a new agrarian future. As N.Ia. Bykhovskii noted, given the
“grandiose” extent of the territory and historical moment, “the land reform must in and
of  itself  be highly grandiose,” mindful  of  its  national  import  while attentive to local
needs.25 Like their predecessors, these reformers also operated from the assumption that
the state should ensure that allotments were sufficient for meeting household needs. In
the throes of revolution, the demands of social justice now required that the means by
which the state allotted land be perceived as more accurate and more just than those
used in 1861.
8 What stands out in this process is the fact that the experts refashioned the allotment of
land  by  norm  used  in  1861,  incorporating  new  information  while  attempting  to
incorporate measures of both consumption and labor usage, and did so with little internal
dissention. Some have portrayed this as a sign of the experts’ failure to achieve their own
Progressivist agenda of the previous decade—a revival of a Populist “intelligentsia legacy”
from the nineteenth century—or as simply being out‑run by events.26 Couched in these
terms, land norms certainly were. But this assumes that the “sons” schooled in statistics
and agronomy had transcended their  “fathers”  Populist  “intelligentsia  legacy”  of  an
additional allotment. Rural professionals well knew that there were instances where land
shortage—either of plowland or other land resources needed for a complete household
economy—required redress before improved/intensive cultivation could make an actual
difference in productivity and livelihood. GZK members and other experts in the League
of Agrarian Reforms recognized this principle—the fact that land reform and agrarian
improvement were essential parts of the same process of “solving” the agrarian question.
Furthermore, having to conform professional worldviews to changing political realities is
not uncommon and is typical for most experts then and now. The majority of urban
experts, despite disappointments and frustrations, applied their expertise to the problem
at hand : devising a means for redistributing the national land fund in an equitable (i.e.,
just) manner. Revolution did not yield agrarian experts the agrarian reform they had
worked for pre‑1914, but rather put them in the position to apply their expertise, at least
on paper, to correcting the ills of 1861 in their current context. In doing so, they hoped to
create a mechanism that well positioned rural Russia to realize their professional aims in
the future—a vibrant and productive national peasant economy.
9 The main task of considering the basis for allotting the national land reserve fell to a
commission  chaired  by  the  Socialist  Revolutionary  party’s  S.L. Maslov.  Charged  with
drafting  a  plan  for  redistributing  land,  the  commission  heard  reports  by  agrarian
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economists  N.P. Makarov,  B.V. Volkov  and  B.D. Brutskus,  and  debated  them  at  three
meetings in July and August 1917.27 Unlike previous reformers,  the assembled experts
were  not  constrained  by  the  need  to  preserve  noble  landholding,  but  rather  by
deteriorating circumstances in the countryside and the knowledge that available land
resources  would  not  allow  them  to  allot  land  with  any  sort  of  arithmetic  equality.
Makarov’s report became the main basis for the commission’s resolutions passed and
submitted  to  the  GZK  on  August 24.  He  argued  that  the  norms  of  1861  would  be
inappropriate in 1917, even though they recognized key geographic variations, as by 1917
it was clear that not enough arable land existed to apply them.28 He then outlined the
bases, strengths and weaknesses of allotting land by a consumption (potrebitel´naia) or
labor  (trudovaia)  norm.  Allotting  land  according  to  a  consumption  norm  (ensuring
households access to the plowland needed to meet their consumption needs, based on
average yields and market prices, of an average household in the area) would result in
some households holding more land that they could work and encourage households to
continuously expand their needs. Conversely, allotting land according to a labor norm
(ensuring households access to the plowland required to occupy its entire labor force
during peak agricultural periods without recourse to hired labor) introduced a number of
additional variables such as the intensification of the household’s economic organization
and variations in the agricultural calendar. Given regional variations and that there was
not enough land to allot households a full amount according to either of these norms,
Makarov  called  for  deriving  and  applying  a  combined  consumption‑labor  norm  (an
average  based  on  land  held  by  groups  of  households  in  each  region  that  met  their
consumption needs sufficiently and employed their full labor force without recourse to
hired labor), that would include consideration of a norm for non‑agricultural income (
promysly).  He  proposed  that  the  state  resolve  any  remaining  inequalities  in  land
distribution through migration and the tax system. Lack of resources, in his mind, also
meant  that  only  households  currently  engaged  in  farming  should  receive  land  (as
opposed to more radical calls that all wanting land should receive an allotment).29
10 B.V. Volkov’s report agreed with Makarov’s conclusions, although he argued the case for
the more radical SR position of a universal right to land and the elimination of peasant
need to  secure  non‑agricultural  income.30 The report  by  economist  Boris  D. Brutskus
spoke  against  Makarov’s  proposals,  arguing  that  undertaking  the  massive  project  of
calculating and applying norms was too complicated and divorced from current rural
realities.  Peasants  were  thinking  only  in  local  terms  and  would  not  tolerate  the
resettlement  of  outsiders  included  in  Makarov’s  plan.  Nor  would  they  tolerate  any
reduction in the land they currently held on the basis of non‑agricultural income, even if
the Constituent Assembly established and sanctioned such norms. Brutskus urged a more
realistic assessment of the peasant perspective. The simplest thing to do (and what was
essentially  happening)  given  the  fact  that  peasants  already  farmed  the  majority  of
available land was to simply give the land to those tilling it. Brutskus lamented the fact
that allotting peasants land under current circumstances would reduce grain production
and reverse recent agronomic gains by encouraging extensive cultivation.31
11 In the discussion of the reports, only Brutskus and A.Ia. Piletskii, spoke out against norms
flatly. Most found something with which to quibble in Makarov’s report, but accepted
norms as the best and most rational means of carrying out the task of land redistribution.
The chair, S.L. Maslov criticized Brutskus for offering little beyond the failed allotment
process of 1861 (i.e., for going with what was expedient rather than determining norms
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scientifically). A.A. Kaufman—with experience in land settlement in Siberia from both an
academic and ministerial perspective—attempted to synthesize the two positions, calling
for  norms  derived  from “real  life”  that  could  be  verified  eventually.32 The  agrarian
economist A.N. Chelintsev, who hinted at agreement with Brutskus, mainly objected to
provisions whereby use of hired labor became an indicator that land holding exceeded
household labor capacity. He also thought Brutskus gave peasants too little credit for
being able to engage in improved tillage after an allotment process.33 Most disagreements
focused not on the use of norms (or even how they should be calculated), but rather on
the questions  of  who should  establish  them (national  vs.  local  institutions),  to  what
territorial  unit  they should  be  applied,  the  extent  to  which non‑agricultural  income
should be factored into the equation, and whether migration might be used to facilitate
land equalization.34 Those disagreeing with the idea of norms, did not object to their
usefulness in their entirety or think them unjust. Even through Brutskus saw them as
futile,  he  admitted their  usefulness  for  distributing lands  not  already under  peasant
cultivation. The main objection to the use of norms was actually an accurate assessment
of current events. As N.P. Oganovskii noted, norms were expected by many, but might not
be in tune with political reality or the peasant demands. Better to simply let peasants till
what they were tilling, allot that small portion outside of this by some sort of norm, and
then get on to the business of encouraging intensification.35
12 Despite  these  concerns  the  commission  approved  and  submitted  to  the  GZK  final
resolutions that called for allocating the national land reserve according to land norms
“based on the land utilization of the average local consumer‑labor holding as determined
(based on local  conditions)  by an adequate satisfaction of  needs,  the utilization of  a
family’s labor force for agricultural work, and the absence of regularly hired agricultural
workers.”  In  addition,  in  areas  where  non‑agricultural  income  played  an  important
economic role, “the effect of these earnings should be taken into consideration in the
land allotment process, except in those cases where the scarcity of land fails to provide
sufficiently high and stable incomes without such employment.”36 The Commission was
content with the idea that the amount of land allotted to the toiler should never fall
below the subsistence level nor exceed the level beyond which the household required
hired labor. This precedent for the future amounted to the same guarantee of sufficiency
of the Emancipation legislation and reform proposals from the Stolypin period such as
access  to  Peasant  Land Bank credit—enough land to keep peasant  households  in the
“middle.” 
 
The peasantry and land norms
13 Peasants were accustomed to looking to the state for a solution to their land needs since
at least the Emancipation, and recent studies have tied their turn to violence in 1905‑1907
(which  became  a  precedent  for  the  seizure  of  estates  in  1917)  with  state  failure,
particularly the promise of the Duma to meet their needs.37 Petitions for an additional
allotment  of  plowland  or  other  type  of  arable  persisted  throughout  1917.  That  the
Ministry of Agriculture chose to delay decision on all but a few of these petitions pending
comprehensive land reform by the Constituent Assembly provided additional frustration
for peasants acculturated to making use of official processes, and contributed to their
transformation from petitioners to activists.38 Mobilized by the war and the legacy of
1905, peasants soon grasped their emerging autonomy in a new world where the state’s
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inability to respond to petitions existed side‑by‑side with an inability to coerce.39 Peasant
congresses viewed land reform as an intentional state reversal of the cut‑offs (otrezki) of
1861, an act of social justice that removed from owners “the part of land not worked by
the owner’s own labor.”40 Of course, determining peasant voice can be difficult, but based
on the  resolutions  of  local  peasant  congresses  and volost  land committees,  peasants
shared  the  GZK’s  conceptualization  of  allotment  norms  as  a  mechanism  of  reform,
expression of social justice, and corrective to the “insufficient allotments” of 1861, even if
they differed on the question of whether or not the reform should aim primarily at local
rather than national needs, and even if they shaped allotment norms to correspond with
their local sense of need and lore.41
14 Local land committees based their actions on two sources of information, reflecting the
bifurcation  of  authority  after  February.  They  submitted  numerous  requests  for  GZK
publications,  particularly  pamphlets  on  land  distribution.  More  than  120 pages  of
correspondence with local land committees and other institutions in GZK records are
requests for its publications related to the establishment of local land committees and
land norms, particularly reports on the latter by Makarov, Kaufman and Chelintsev.42
Resolutions on the land question by national and local peasant congresses and soviets
provided local committees a second source of information. Peasant congresses, although
populated by peasant deputies, tended to be driven by political activists seeking to woo
peasant constituents and establish their land reform credentials.43 In the absence of clear
direction,  even  local Provisional  Government  officials  took  their  cues  from  these
resolutions and became dismayed as the bifurcation of the dominant SR party disrupted
the semblance of stability provided by the First All‑Russian Peasant Congress’ resolutions.
44 The main thrust of the peasant congress resolutions, encapsulated in the First Congress’
May 1917 “Model Mandate” (based on a synthesis of 242 local mandates presented by
deputies) called for the abolition of private property in land, its recognition as national
property (consistent with past state hesitancy to privatize anything considered necessary
for supporting the commonweal45), and the alienation of all land and inventory in private
and state hands for distribution to, and use by, all desiring to work it with their own
family  labor  (with  the  question  of  redemption  to  be  decided  by  the  Constituent
Assembly). The distribution of alienated land among the laboring population was to take
place on the basis of equality and in accordance with local conditions on the basis of a
labor or consumption norm, with periodic repartitions connected to the growth of the
population under the guidance of both central and local institutions of self‑governance,
including the commune.46
15 Provincial peasant congress resolutions informed national ones, which transmitted them
back to the provinces in an amalgamated form. The provincial land committees drew
inspiration from both. There was often personnel overlap between the congresses and
land committees.  The chair  of  the Mogilev Provincial  Land Committee was an active
participant in the province’s peasant con-gresses.47 Provincial  and district  (uezd)  land
committees  populated  by  (in  addition  to  Provisional  Government  officials)  zemstvo
professionals and more advanced peasant activists diligently sought to both carry out the
GZK’s  information  requests  and  regulate  land  use  in  a  manner  conducive  to  grain
production. The Samara provincial land committee illustrates this well. On one hand, the
provincial land committee took as a guide for managing land relations the “Temporary
Rules of Land Use in Samara Province Prior to the Constituent Assembly” passed by the
Second Samara Province Peasant Congress, agreeing in its mid‑July meeting to publish
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and distribute copies of the rules and draft resolutions about their implementation. At
the same time, the committee passed resolutions aimed at fulfilling the GZK’s requests.48
16 To the extent that the Samara provincial land committee’s actions were perhaps atypical,
the difference stemmed from the fact that it had an exceptionally competent agricultural
statistician in place who, having studied the question of land norms for over ten years,
presented a detailed report on land norms for the committee’s consideration. Grigorii I.
Baskin,  working  from  the  premises of  economist  S.N. Iuzhakov,  reached  a  similar
conclusion as the GZK : that neither a labor norm nor a consumption norm on their own
adequately  accounted  for  all  peasant  households’  ability  to use  their  available  labor
supply to meet their needs—that neither on its own could equitably achieve a desired
increase in households’ well‑being.49 Baskin suggested that while typical indicators such
as the number of adult male workers and draft animals were important, the transition of
many peasant households from a “natural economy” to a monetized one meant that any
analysis aimed at determining norms reflective of both labor and consumption needed to
consider distance to markets (and hence, actual market participation) as a key analytical
indicator. Baskin’s report also raised the issue of non‑agricultural employment and the
role that such income should play in determining the allotment norm for each locale.50
Accepting his analysis, the provincial committee required district and volost committees
to obtain answers to questions in addition to those posed by the GZK for the derivation
and application of a norm‑based land reform. The questions were a public opinion survey
of key difficulties associated with land reform that Baskin’s report raised in the minds of
the provincial committee representatives, particularly questions aimed at determining
who should get land (Adult males only ? Absentees on otkhod ? Newcomers ? Settled wage
laborers ?), whether or not those with non‑agricultural income should be allotted land,
attitudes  on  the  commune  and  communal  reorganization,  attitudes  toward  Stolypin
separators, and opinion on the size of consumption and labor land allotments.51
17 Unfortunately, we do not have the responses to these questions from Samara’s uezd and
volost land committees. We do, however, have the resolutions of volost and district land
committees from other provinces, which reveal the extent to which peasants expected
and  defined  allotment  by  norm.  In  Vologda  province,  the  Golovetsk  volost  land
committee, meeting at the end of June, called for the transfer of all land to the laboring
peasantry and for continued state developmental assistance for the volost’s agricultural
economy, including supplying households with the implements needed for farming and
forestry. The volost committee also called on the state to use its authority to transfer
forests suitable for clearing as hayfields in neighboring Razgortsk volost to Golovetsk
volost, as Razgortsk, in its assessment, already had adequate hayfields and as the desired
forests were located too far from Razgortsk to do inhabitants any good.52 The Semeikovsk
volost land committee also requested agronomic assistance in its resolutions, called for
each peasant to have at least six desiatiny of land in one spot and, given that the district’s
poor  soil  quality  required  “more  agronomic  cultivation”  asked  the  state  to  provide
agricultural implements at a reduced price.53 In essence, committee resolutions asked the
state to continue its project of re‑ordering the countryside, a project with which it had
been engaged in various forms over the previous century.
18 In addition to expectations of state assistance in creating a new agrarian order, the volost
committees  also  turned  to  allotment  norms  as  the  proper  means  for  allotting  land,
expressing them sometimes as labor norms and sometimes with no stated rationale at all.
Thus Vologda’s Veprevsk volost land committee resolved that
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[…] all land belongs to the laboring peasantry as a whole according to a norm of
cultivation  from the  general  state  land  fond  no  greater  than 7½ des.  per  good,
strong worker able to cultivate the following : 3½ desiatiny of arable land, based on
28 working days in a month, ½ desiatina sown in winter crops, ½ desiatina in spring
crops and ½ desiatina of fallow ; besides this it is necessary to have a reserve of ½ 
desiatina per person and 1½ desiatiny of pastureland. This is all based on extended
experience from a purely practical point of view. In addition, all require access for
purposes of heating and building repairs to a necessary amount of either communal
or state forest reserves.54
19 Vologda’s  Sychevsk volost  land committee issued similar resolutions,  calling for land
from the state land fund to be allotted according to a “norm of cultivation (po norme
obrabotki).”55 In Poltava the Mashevsk volost  land committee,  inundated by returning
soldiers, resolved on 23 July to temporarily prioritize soldiers in the allotment process
(whether out of a sense of patriotism or fear is not known) by establishing a “norm of
[land] rental per household” of up to six desiatiny depending on its ability to work the
land with its  own labor.  In  Riazan´  the  Andreevsk volost  land committee,  reflecting
debate by all the volost’s communal assemblies, resolved that the “labor norm for the
alienation of land” should be applied equally to all farmers, including nobles opting to
participate under these terms.56 In other words, even prior to the Bolsheviks’ Decree on
Land peasants  were  already  incorporating  the  language  of norms  to  division  of  the
available land fund, not as part of a national plan, but simply as a means of absorbing
what land existed.
 
Land norms and the red repartition
20 The Bolsheviks inherited the “land norm” idea (and the professional staff of the GZK and
Agriculture Ministry), although for Lenin and his colleagues, land norms corresponded
more  to  the  needs  of  the  moment  than  their  vision  an  agrarian  future  based  on
large‑scale  farming  operations.57 A  decade  earlier,  Lenin  viewed  the  “norm”  idea  as
evidence of a Kadet desire to preserve a pomeshchik economy behind a veil of reform and
Populist timidity.58 October changed all of this, as the new regime nationalized all lands
and now required a means to distribute them. Despite their own plans and suspicion of
peasants,  the  Bolsheviks  had  to  make  land  norms  their  own,  especially  given  their
alliance with the Left  SRs,  their reliance on existing professionals,  and the reality of
events in the countryside.  The Congress of  Soviets  of  Workers and Soldiers  Deputies
Decree on Land of 26 October 1917 specified land reform terms that, other than blatantly
abolishing  private  property  in  land,  bore  a  striking  resemblance  to  pre‑October
proposals. “Highly cultured” estates such as gardens, nurseries, and orchards were to be
kept intact as state property, as were pedigreed livestock herds. Those capable of working
land received equal use rights based on local land use conditions and either labor or
consumption norms. State‑sponsored migration by volunteers or discredited commune
members  (e.g.,  deserters)  would  eventually  alleviate  land  shortages  in  the  densest
regions.59 By December there were decrees creating the machinery for land distribution :
a  main land committee  supervising local  committees  charged with inventorying and
distributing local  resources  to qualified recipients.60 The state  served as  the primary
agent for transforming a national economy and, through the local soviets, overseer of the
process of meting out social justice.
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21 This was to be a grand reconciliation of the sins of 1861, symbolized by issuance of the
Basic  Law on  the  Socialization  of  Land on  the  Emancipation’s  anniversary  (February 19,
1918).  The  statute  aimed  to  control  spontaneous  land  seizures  to  ensure  that  land
redistributions  corresponded  with  state  and  peasant  needs,  and  reflected  experts’
realization that events had increased the complexities of implementation. Despite central
attempts to gather information and manage the process, including sending surveyors and
other professionals to the village, the actions of local communes prevailed.61 As the food
situation  deteriorated  and  the  influx  of  urbanites  and demobilizing  soldiers  flooded
villages,  achieving  equal  land  distributions  that  respected  the  labor  principle  and
improved  households’  wellbeing  made  balancing  both  labor  and  consumption norms
more difficult and more important. Defining what unit to use for determining norms was
challenging. “Revisional souls” were now obsolete, relegated to history’s dustbin by the
revolution. Balancing allotment by “eaters” with the labor norm idea that land belonged
to those who worked it themselves remained administrators’ chief difficulty, as emphasis
on the “laboring peasantry” or the “labor economy” encapsulated in the “labor norm”
idea conflicted even more with a hungry population’s need for allotment norms based on
consumption. Labor norms also proved problematic because they tended to favor large
families perceived as being class enemies (kulaks). In practice, the right to eat outweighed
the labor norm and the application of some sort of a consumption norm, in some ways
the most radical alternative, prevailed.62 In the aggregate, the amount of land gained by
any one household was negligible with the exception of steppe provinces. At the same
time (and despite jockeying within the village by households seeking to maximize their
additional  land  eligibility),  over  the  course  of  1918‑1920  landless  and  land  hungry
peasants eventually were able to improve their positions. As Atkinson put it (referring to
the process of state formation under Ivan III), the Bolshevik state’s “‘regathering of the
lands’” had resulted in a substantial leveling of rural society.”63 In this sense, allotment
according to norm had served the interests of social justice in that it addressed the chief
complaints of peasants and their advocates.
22 Bolshevik  policy  increasingly  aimed  toward  an  Aristotelian  mean  in  land  relations,
despite  rhetoric  privileging  poor  households  over  others.  “The  distribution  of  land
between laborers,” Article 12 stated, 
must  be  carried  out  on equalizing‑labor  bases  such that  the  consumption‑labor
norm pertaining in a given region to the historically formed system of land use
does  not  exceed  the  labor  capacity  (trudosposobnosti)  […]  of  each  individual
household and, at the same time, would provide the possibility of a comfortable (
bezbednogo) existence to the farmer’s family.64 
23 Aiming towards the middle, the instructions for determining norms specified guidelines
for determining average production figures for all types of arable in a given region and
average peasant landholding (including use of purchased and rented lands prior to 1917).
65 They  also  marked  a  milestone  in  rural  studies,  as  experts  finally  agreed  which
household members should be counted as unable to work, and what portion of a worker
women and older children would count as in labor norm calculations.66 The instructions
granted  exceptions  allowing  allotments  of  land  beyond  the  norm  for  households
overburdened by non‑workers,  holding poor quality  existing allotments,  or  receiving
poor quality additional allotments.
24 The  Bolsheviks’  Basic  Law paid  much  attention  to  local  particularisms  despite  their
universalizing  ideology.  This  reflected  the  input  of  experts  anxious  to  ensure  that
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redistributions justly reflected variations in soil quality and other factors at the local
level. Perhaps they also realized that volost committees were already in charge. In a few
places, uezd officials created special organizations to establish norms—with or without
the assistance of local experts. For example, Stavropol´ uezd (Stavropol´) established a
special commission of representatives for this work, while Petrograd province invited
communal representatives to serve as permanent members of the land department for
determining  the  allotment  norm.  As  we might  expect,  the  local  implementation  of
specialists’ meticulously crafted guidelines often fell apart due to the complexity of trying
to  adapt  norms  established  for  the  “average”  or  “typical”  family  to  different
combinations of workers and “eaters” in individual households. According to one study,
108 of 132 uezdy simply used “eater” as the primary unit of land distribution. Use of the
labor  norm  tended  to  prevail  in  the  areas  bordering  European  Russia.  The  central
provinces claimed to divide land by “eater,” but often just followed the provisional land
division made prior to calculating and assigning norms, which local officials viewed as in
the interests of the poor. Local perceptions of who was in need often drove the process. In
several cases, local peasants resisted application of labor norms over consumption norms,
believing that labor norms favored kulak households. As such, consumption norms alone
often prevailed.67 At the same time, evidence indicates that when peasant communities
imposed their own divisions, they sought out state bodies to provide their decisions with
legitimacy.68
25 Of the local particularisms experts considered, soil variations in provinces and uezdy were
the most important. This complicated the allotment process, leading to the establishment
of separate allotment norms for different soil categories. Prior to 1917, the use of soil data
caused a certain amount of turmoil in zemstvo circles. Even though zemstvo statisticians
factored  soil  quality  into  assessments,  they  resisted  the  idea  that  this  factor  always
outweighed social factors in computing land values.69 Now that all land belonged to
peasants, however, arguments about the particularisms of peasant husbandry were moot
and soil quality became a primary factor in equitable distributions. Although some areas,
such as Nizhnii‑Novgorod province attempted to make use of existing soil data, many
local committees simply divided land into “black soil,” “transitional,” and “non‑black
soil” or “good,” “average,” and “poor” sectors, placing volost land into each category
based on ten‑year harvest averages. Most instructions simply mentioned considering soil
quality in calculations without specifying how, which in most cases simply resulted in
considering soil quality along the same lines as communes did in their repartitions.70
26 At the end of the day, the most important factor affecting allotment norm size after
October (as peasants already realized over the summer of 1917) was simply the amount of
land available for redistribution. Often, boards merely divided the amount of available
land  by  the  number  of  people  or  “eaters”  employed  in  farming,  making  the  norm
essentially an arithmetic factor of the quantity of land and the density of the population.
Norms established in many local statutes were reduced owing to a lack of available land,
or at least available land near enough to needy households as to be useful. In these cases
land was  often allotted much like  it  was  in  the Emancipation—according to  existing
average allotment size. In some cases, officials remained in the same difficult position as
their imperial predecessors in that population density rendered an equal redistribution
on any basis nonsensical, as it would result in depriving all households of a sufficient
allotment.71 Even if applying norms in the field proved difficult or impractical, however,
the norms and instructions reflected the aims of the experts who devised them. The
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concepts of “sufficiency,” and the labor household prevailed and pointed not just to an
equitable  distribution  of the  new national  land  fund,  but  a  distribution  designed  to
bolster the land‑short at the expense of those who, by the rules, had too much. As the
chronicler of these events, GZK member P.N. Pershin noted, “norms of land use played a
necessary role [in land redistribution] to the extent that they conveyed the interests of
the poor and middle peasantry, supplying it with favorable conditions for the conduct of
an economy and, along with the prohibition on hired labor, depriving the kulak strata of
the  village  of  agro‑economic  primacy.”72 For  the  Soviet  state  land  allotment  norms
represented  the  rational  implementation  of  a  class‑based  system  of  social  justice,
although one frequently supplanted by material realities, local officials, and the peasants
themselves.
 
Land norms and the whites
27 That White governments turned to land norms and a commitment to laboring households
(at least on paper) testifies to the deep penetration of the idea of norms into all levels of
imperial society, a penetration facilitated by the fact that the White movement inherited
its  share  of  agrarian  experts  and  technocrats  from  the  old  regime.73 White  reform
proposals all endorsed a transfer of land allotments imbued with property rights to the
laboring peasantry according to some concept of allotment norms. Estate owners could
find in norms a guarantee that they would at least retain some of their land—more if they
could prove that theirs was an intensively farmed property or one employing a special
form of husbandry. White leaders hoped that peasants would interpret their norms and
property  guarantees  as  a  better  alternative  to  Bolshevik  decrees.  By  1918,  however,
compensation was a non‑starter for most peasants, especially as Bolshevik land policies
legitimated land seizures up to a given norm without requiring compensation to former
owners. Norms were a convenient tool for White leaders when it came to walking the fine
line  between  their  noble  officers  and  the  peasants  who  fed  them,  but  the  White
leadership’s inability to move beyond the idea of compensation doomed their reforms
and any chance of peasant support to defeat.
28 In Siberia, 1919 decrees by Admiral A.V. Kolchak guaranteed sowers a right to harvest the
lands they planted, even if such lands were subsequently returned to owners, and offered
the possibility of  acquiring full  property rights over sown lands for laboring peasant
households.74 Kolchak (like other White commanders) apparently favored a program of
“khutorization.” The land decrees’ emphases on “working peasant households” reflected
belief that there should be a connection between land allotments and ability to work
them without hired labor.  In the Don Territory,  Cossack resentment over the state’s
award  of  land  to  Cossack  bureaucrats  in  lieu  of  salary  and  hostility  toward  land
speculators led to near unanimous support for seizing private lands for redistribution
when the Krug for the Salvation of the Don met in July and August 1918.75 The resultant
land reform law set norms for private property at 30 to 50 desiatiny, with land above this
norm to be alienated and allotted to land short Cossacks and native peasants free of
charge. Owners would be compensated for buildings and improvements, but not the land
itself.  As  with  other  White  land  reform  programs,  the  need  for  grain  and  revenue
distorted policy implementation. In the Don, free distribution turned into leasing in kind,
and some parcels actually went up for auction, undermining the authorities’ credibility.76
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29 The Volunteer Army’s land policies illustrate the White predicament and the use of land
norms in the South. With a constitution focused on private property and the rule of law
and a governing council that never discussed land reform, it would seem that peasants
had little chance of acquiring additional land.77 The influence of former landowners and
those opposed to expropriation of any sort was strong among White leaders’ inner circles.
At the same time, there is evidence that this should be interpreted less as an inherent
antipathy to land reform and more as simply a statement of what the Constitution’s Kadet
authors valued most : the rule of law and the primacy of the Constituent Assembly in
addressing  reform  issues.78 The  essence  of  the  White  proposals,  in  the  South  and
elsewhere, aimed at a “consolidation of the average [household] economy” as the basis
for a stable and productive countryside—a wager on the middle peasant who would have
enough  to  maintain  a  stable  economic  life  but  not  enough  to  potentially  exploit
neighbors.79 General Anton I. Denikin’s attempts to gain peasant support through land
reform aimed to fulfill the aspirations of landowners, peasants and procurement officers
alike, a balancing act bequeathed to his successors. Land norms provided a mechanism
that  met  this  need.  Denikin’s  attempts  to  secure support  for  a  land reform came to
naught, but embodied the key ideas ultimately incorporated into his successor’s decrees.
According  to  Denikin,  land  reform  should  safeguard  the  interests  of  the  working
population by strengthening small‑  and medium‑sized holdings at the expense of the
state and large landowners while preserving owners’ property rights. District committees
should  determine  the  size  of  maximum holdings  and  subject  lands  in  excess  of  the
maximum to compensated forcible alienation.  Highly productive estates,  forests,  land
unsuitable for cultivation, and Cossack lands remained inviolable. All landowners should
receive state aid to stimulate production. In essence, Denikin was prepared to allot land
according to availability and norms under some system of compensation to landowners.80 
30 By 1920 defeats and the reality of peasant land seizures forced even opponents of land
reform outside of a Constituent Assembly, including General P.N. Wrangel and former
Minister of Agriculture A.V. Krivoshein, to admit that the land question required action.
Wrangel appointed a committee under Senator G.V. Glinka to devise a reform project.81
Glinka  was  well  suited  to  oversee  the  project  given  his  ministerial  experience  in
implementing the Stolypin reforms.82 On the 20th of April Wrangel sent a memorandum to
the committee outlining his expectations that bore much resemblance to Denikin’s earlier
proposal.  It  affirmed  his  commitment  to  private  property,  and  demanded  that  land
“should belong to those who work it” and not “be subject to renting or speculation.”
Furthermore, “Depending on the availability of land, on density of population, and on the
prevailing type of  agriculture,  norms should be established in such a  way as  to suit
different circumstances (in districts and in provinces)” with lands beyond these norms
subject to alienation (with the exception of intensely cultivated estates and special farms.
Those receiving land would be responsible for compensating its former owners.83 The
committee’s initial work disappointed Wrangel, but a subsequent revision became the
basis for two orders in 1920 that largely followed his original instructions, but contained
stronger  language related to  compensation and defined how local  committees  would
determine land values.84
31 Wrangel’s land policy, according to Senator Glinka and as manifest in the 1920 Order on
Land (Prikaz o zemle), proceeded from the right of private property in land “as the singular
foundational basis of a proper state land structure” and was the primary distinguishing
feature between Wrangel’s policy and that of the Soviets. Referencing Peter the Great,
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however, Glinka noted that this foundational principle was subject to modification by the
state, which served as the final arbiter of land tenure and which possessed the power of
eminent domain to advance its interests.85 At the same time, Wrangel also acknowledged
the right of all current farmers “to a defined quantity of land” (as established by the
Emancipation). The state’s role, and the aim of the Order, was balancing these two ideas to
benefit the common good. Alienation with compensation was a traditional principle of
the legal system since 1861. The benefits of free labor applied to property inherent in the
Emancipation strengthened the principle of property ownership in the Order on Land. If
this was socialism, Glinka argued—taking a swipe at critics from the right—then it was
socialism  from  the  throne.  The  project’s  aim  at  breaking  up  large  estates  was  not
introducing a new idea into the countryside, but merely continuing the process begun by
the Emancipation (and also well in line with conceptions of property as a public good).
Glinka  contrasted  this  approach,  rooted  in  the  Emancipation’s  land  allotment  and
redemption process for existing local farmers and that of the socialists’ promises of land
to anyone on the basis of some future land order. Wrangel, Glinka argued, was offering
something  real.86 Thus,  a  type  of  eminent  domain  rooted  in  Russia’s  past  and  the
expansion of private property ownership oddly went hand‑in‑hand in Wrangel’s Order.
This is also apparent in its redemption process where, in contrast to the Emancipation’s
redemption  operation,  the  real  benefit  of  the  redemption  process  under  the  Order’s 
implementation terms went not to those being compensated, but rather to the peasant
payers themselves. This was the key to reinforcing the value of property ownership. The
actual sufficiency of the payment for the owner experiencing compulsory alienation was
not the main guide in determining the size of payments. Furthermore, although the state
would certainly accept cash and a shortened redemption time line if offered, the payment
structure reflected a moral economy approach : one‑fifth of the average harvest yielded
by the land being redeemed over twenty‑five years, thus making both the state and the
new property owners equal partners in the assumption of agrarian risk.87
32 Besides  a  commitment  to  spreading  property  ownership  and  compensating  former
owners, the Order differed from the GZK and Bolshevik approaches in two other ways.
First, Wrangel believed that any allotment of land was a local affair for local persons.
There was no single solution to the land question on an all‑Russian scale, and as such, the
details of land reform in each locale were best left to local institutions such as the volost
(“peasant”) and district zemstvos.88 This represented a more decentralized approach to
the land question than that of the GZK and Bolsheviks. Second, although the issue of
allotting land to anyone who desired it divided the GZK membership, in the end the SR
belief  in  allotting  land  to  all  who desired  it  and  could  till  it  with  their  own hands
prevailed and made it in to the Bolshevik land decrees. Wrangel adamantly opposed this,
not only on the basis of practicality and rural stability,  but also based on the deeply
rooted value of a connection to land and place. Only farmers already in situ and engaged
in farming there should receive land. The “socialist” plan to relocate peasants from one
place to another was “incompatible with the basic freedom to establish an economic life
that belongs to everyone.”89 According to Glinka, this distinguished Wrangel’s project
from that of the Soviets.
33 Second,  the Order took great care to distinguish itself  from the Bolsheviks and other
socialists in its use of land norms. The GZK and Bolshevik projects’ use of norms aimed at
assuring peasants a subsistence niche : labor and consumption norms aimed to provide
households the minimum land allotment required to apply the household’s labor/meet its
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consumption needs.  They were  norms based on the  idea  of  correcting  “insufficient”
allotments by making them “sufficient.” Wrangel’s Order, with its emphasis on the local
allotment  of  land  to  local  farmers  assured  them “not  an  amount  of  land  calculated
according to some sort of utopian provisioning or consumption norm that one might
desire, but only that [amount of land] which one has the ability to manage, that is to
cultivate.”90 Rather than “sufficiency,” the Order’s conception of norms stemmed from an
idea  of  maximum  allotments  rooted  in  past  tsarist  discussions  of  agrarian  reform,
harkening  back  to  the  Stolypin  Reforms’  prelude  and  V.I. Gurko’s  proposed  use  of
maximums to break up the empire’s large latifundia in order to increase peasant land
allotments.91 The  Emancipation  statute  set  maximum  allotment  norms,  as  did  other
tsarist initiatives such as the maximum amount of land any one household was allowed to
accumulate  according  to  the  rules  governing  the  Peasant  Land  Bank.  The  Bank
established these  regional  norms in  the  1890s.92 In  reality,  these  Peasant  Land Bank
maximums, stipulated by the Order on Land, were labor norms—the maximum amount of
land for a given region that an average family could work with its own labor. As Glinka
noted, 
It may be bad or good, but all land management practices proceed from the fact and
only from the fact of farming itself, and from the practical size of land use, which
should not leave land un‑worked and should not be outside the closest connection
to the landholder himself.93 
34 Although Glinka and the Order assiduously sought to avoid using the same language of
norms found in the work of the GZK and the Bolshevik land decrees, at the end of the day
the transfer of land to the laboring population (here more broadly defined in class terms)
according  to  a  household’s  ability  to  live  on it  and work it  was,  for  all  intents  and
purposes a White labor norm.
35 We generally pass over Wrangel’s Order on Land as a curiosity—another case of White
leaders doing too little, too late. Naturally, it differed in key ways from the GZK projects
and Bolshevik land decrees, which envisioned implementation of single national plans of
reform (albeit via mechanisms that provided for local input and implementation). The
Wrangel Order placed more emphasis on the local than the GZK intended for local land
committees. Wrangel’s volost (“peasant”) zemstvo was assigned a roll in the land reform
process that the GZK’s local land committees had essentially seized (much to many GZK
members’  dismay),  and which the Bolsheviks then legitimated and directed into local
soviets. Furthermore, in line with its emphasis on the local, the Wrangel Order limited
land allotment to local inhabitants already farming in the area. This was a departure from
GZK and Bolshevik plans to eventually move people from land poor to land rich regions as
well as a departure from the plans of more radical GZK members and Bolsheviks to allot
land to all who wanted to farm it with their own labor. The most profound difference, of
course, was the White insistence on allotting land as private property (as opposed to
allotting  land  for  use  only)  and  the  redemption  program  (despite  its  claims  to  be
weighted in favor of those redeeming it rather than former owners). Even though the
proposed  redemption  operation  bore  a  striking  resemblance  to  the  future  NEP
tax‑in‑kind and even though there were peasant communities willing to pay a “fair price”
for the land, by the summer of 1917 redemption on any basis was a dead issue. Finally,
Wrangel’s Order connected itself to the Emancipation, proceeding from the premise of
land ownership maximums based on existing institutional norms rather than the premise
of correcting the ills of 1861 by satisfying the quest for “sufficient allotments.”
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Conclusion
36 In the end, Wrangel’s “Order on Land” could claim many of the same common roots as
the programs of the GZK, the Bolsheviks, and the peasants themselves. Rather than being
yet  another  example  of  the  Provisional  Government’s  failure,  the  work  of  the  GZK,
succeeded in establishing and perpetuating the language and framework—the allotment
norm—that defined the terms and process of land reform (at least on paper) and the
pursuit of social justice for a diverse array of socio‑political actors. All parties viewed land
reform as a state obligation to allot land. In one way or another, all saw this as a moral
obligation to correctly implement the land allotment promise of 1861 to the laboring
peasantry. For all participants, land norms provided a measureable means to equitably
implement social justice. Although divided on a host of other social and political issues,
the place of land norms as the best available mechanism for ensuring the state’s just
distribution of available land provided a common interpretive framework for all parties
in 1917,  a framework reflective of  the agrarian consensus that  had developed in the
preceding decade and of the technocratic statist perspective of the experts propelled into
the  position  of  policy  makers  by  war  and  revolution.  In  addition  to  their  apparent
objectivity  and  fairness,  norms  represented  for  experts  a  guarantee  that  the  state’s
distribution of the land fond would have some chance of advancing their pre‑war agenda
for agricultural development. Managed extensification by norm could not only ensure a
just  land  distribution,  but  also  pave  the  way  for  continuing  the  work  of  land
reorganization and technical improvement initiated over the preceding decade by the
state,  the  zemstvos,  and  agrarian  professionals  and  for  fulfilling  the  state’s  moral
obligations.
37 In one sense, the revolution opened new doors for agrarian professionals, policy makers
and  the  objects  of  their  work—peasants—by deciding  once  and  for  all  that  Russia’s
agrarian future, at least for the time being, was to rest on the household economies of
peasant  small‑holders  provided  with  normatized  land  allotments  and  agronomic
assistance. The key to Russia’s agrarian future—whether Imperial, Soviet, or something in
between—was  neither  a  two‑tiered  economy  (peasant  and  pomeshchik),  nor  a
Stolypin‑esque “wager on the strong,” but rather a wager on a rural economy where
farmers  had  sufficient  access  to  land  as  a  first  step  toward  increasing  productivity
through improved husbandry. Peasant household economies damaged by the “cut‑offs” of
1861  could  now  be  healed,  and  all  farmers,  by a  combination  of  means,  given  the
subsistence means required to become legitimate actors in the new national economy. In
essence,  this  was  a  revolutionary  attempt  to  normatize  the social  structure  of  the
countryside  as  a  whole  by  means  of  privileging  a  nostalgic  connection  between the
farmer and the soil that could only be found among households with enough land to meet
their consumption needs and occupy their complete labor force, but no more. The main
beneficiary of this vision of the agrarian future was the middle peasant—the seredniak. For
the experts of the GZK and League of Agrarian Reforms such as Professor A.A. Rybnikov,
the experience of Western Europe had already demonstrated the efficacy of mid‑sized
farms as engines of rural economic development.94 By 1919, Lenin argued to the Eighth
Party  Congress  that  the  seredniak had  become  a  potential  ally  in  guaranteeing  the
Revolution’s survival and feeding the population.95 By 1920, farms of middling size based
on land allotment maximums provided the retreating Whites with some guarantee that
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former noble landowners might have some place in the new agrarian order. In this way,
land norms pointed toward a  just  solution to the land question that  would create a
unified agrarian economy poised for development, allowing the state to fulfill the 1861
Emancipation’s moral promise.
38 Yet, in the end, differing conceptions of this moral commitment—the specifics of local
conditions and politics—overrode the theoretical objectivity of norms, especially as the
need to feed came to dominate state and local agendas and peasant impatience combined
with a sense of agency to advance parochial interests at the expense of national ones.
Thus,  for the Bolsheviks,  land allotment norms were useful  only in as much as they
provided a convenient mechanism for ensuring a just division of the spoils that would
advantage  potential  village  allies  to  the  detriment  of  class  foes  and  facilitate  grain
production. For the Whites, land norms perpetuated a statist approach to agrarian reform
that provided political cover from the right and left for leaders who belatedly realized
land reform’s political necessity. Peasants accepted the concept of allotment by norm,
adapting it to fit their local needs and ideas of what constituted “sufficient,” but did so
with little regard to how local land resources might fit into a national program of land
reform. In their application,  norms as tied to local  notions of “sufficiency” and local
assessments of resources could prevent neither economic chaos nor a violent realization
of the “black repartition” (chernyi peredel) long dreaded by some and desired by others.
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ABSTRACTS
Between 1861 and 1917 a  “land allotment mentalité” developed among government officials,
public activists and peasants themselves that shaped discussions of land reform in 1917 and the
following years, representing a broad consensus on how social justice as it applied to land reform
might be judged and measured. Based on the published and archival materials of the Main Land
Committee,  peasant  congress  publications,  and  the  Hoover  Institution  Archive’s  Wrangel
Collection this article examines discussions of land reform in the revolutionary period. It shows
that from the Provisional Government’s Main Land Committee down to peasant assemblies and
ultimately both sides of the post-October Civil War the “norm” was understood as a fundamental
moral and economic foundation for any new order.
Entre 1861 et 1917, le développement, chez les représentants du gouvernement, les activistes
publics et les paysans eux-mêmes, d’une sorte de « mentalité de l’attribution des terres » façonna
les discussions relatives à la réforme agraire, en 1917 et les années suivantes. Elle rassemblait un
large consensus sur la façon dont la justice sociale, telle qu’appliquée à la réforme, pouvait être
évaluée  et  mesurée.  S’appuyant  sur  des  sources  publiées  et  des  archives  du  Comité  central
agraire,  des  publications  issues  des  congrès  paysans  et  du  fonds  d’archives  Wrangel  de
l’Institution Hoover, cet article étudie les discussions sur la réforme agraire pendant la période
révolutionnaire. Il montre que dans toutes les strates – Comité central agraire du gouvernement
provisoire, assemblées paysannes, ou belligérants de la guerre civile – la « norme » se comprenait
comme le fondement moral et économique essentiel de tout nouvel ordre. 
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